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Abstract
This note presents a kind of the strong law of large numbers for an insurance risk caused
by a single catastrophic event rather than by an accumulation of independent and identically
distributed risks. We derive this result by a large diversification effect resulting from optimal
allocation of the risk to many reinsurers or investors.
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It is well-known that the expected value premium principle is justified by the law of large
numbers. Namely, if an insurance company has a collection of risks W1,W2, . . ., which is inde-
pendent and identically distributed, then by the strong law of large numbers in probability theory,
we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
n
∑
i=1
Wi = E[W1]
with probability one. Thus the averaged risk is approximately amount to the capital given by
the expectation of the individual risk. This means in general that by collecting independent risks
and by adding the expected value premium we can decrease the uncertainty of the risk to zero
eventually.
The objective of this note is to ask how about the case where the risk is caused by a single
catastrophic event rather than by an accumulation of a large number of independent events. In
this case, of course, we cannot apply the strong law of large numbers in probability theory.
Instead, we approach to this problem by considering a diversification of the single risk to a large
number of reinsurers or investors.
To formulate the problem mathematically, suppose that an insurance company with initial
capital w0 has a risk with loss random variable X . Here we assume that X is bounded. Then the
resulting position of the company at a terminal time becomes w0 −X . Suppose moreover that
this company would like to diversify this risk partly to another n reinsurers or investors, each of
which has an initial capital wi, i = 1, . . . ,n, as a reinsurance or a securitization. Let us denote by
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X0 the risk that the originator covers, and by Xi the one allocated to the i-th reinsurer or investor,
for i = 1, . . . ,n. Each participant is willing to accept this risk if the resulting expected utility is
greater than or equal to that of the initial capital. The allocation problem is thus defined as
maxE[u0(w0−X0)],
s.t. E[ui(wi−Xi)]≥ ui(wi), i = 1, . . . ,n,
(1)
over all bounded random variables Xi such that X0 + · · ·+Xn = X . Here, u0 denotes the utility
function of the insured, and ui the one of the i-th reinsurers, i = 1, . . . ,n. Note that in order
the problem (1) to be feasible, the allocated random variables Xi, i = 1, . . . ,n, necessarily take
negative values, which include benefits of the transaction for the participants.
The problem (1) is categorized as an optimal design of insurance policies or more generally
as a risk sharing problem. See Borch [1], [2], Raviv [7], Bru¨hlmann [3], Gerber [5], and the
references therein. It should be remarked that to our best knowledge, the limiting analysis with
respect to the number of agents is not studied in the literature except Fukuda et.al [4] where some
dynamic insurance pricing is examined.
Let us denote by ˆXi ≡ ˆX (n)i , i = 0,1, . . . ,n, a solution of (1). Then we will claim that ˆX (n)0
converges to E[X ] as n → ∞ with probability one. This implies that the optimal covering of the
risk for the originator is approximately the expectation of the risk, so the expected value premium
principle is justified provided that the risk is sold to a large number of investors.
To solve (1), first we assume that each player has an exponential utility function:
ui(x) =
1
ai
(1− e−aix), x ∈ R, i = 0, . . . ,n,
with ai > 0, i = 0, . . . ,n. Then, for a given λi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,n, we consider
(2) max
n
∑
i=0
λiE[ui(wi−Xi)]
over all bounded random variable Xi, i = 0, . . . ,n such that X = X0 + · · ·+Xn, where we have set
λ0 = 1. Suppose that { ˆXi}ni=0 is a solution to the problem (2) for some {λi}ni=1 such that
(3) E[ui(wi− ˆXi)] = ui(wi), i = 1, . . . ,n.
Then for {Xi} satisfying X = ∑ni=0 Xi and the constraints in (1), we have
E[u0(w0−X0)]≤ E[u0(w0−X0)]+
n
∑
i=1
λi (E[ui(wi−Xi)]−ui(wi)])
=
n
∑
i=0
λiE[ui(wi−Xi)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiui(wi)≤
n
∑
i=0
λiE[ui(wi− ˆXi)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiui(wi)
= E[u0(w0− ˆX0)].
Hence { ˆXi}ni=0 is a solution to (1). Therefore, our task is to solve (2) for any {λ}ni=1 and then
choose {λ}ni=1 to satisfy (3).
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Now, by Borch’s risk exchange theorem (see, e.g., Gerber and Pafumi [6] for a review with
notation similar to ours), the optimal { ˆXi}ni=0 exists and necessarily satisfies
λiu′i(wi− ˆXi) = λ ju′j(w j − ˆX j), i, j = 0,1, . . . ,n,
almost surely. Thus the random variable
Λ = λie−aiwi eai ˆXi
does not depend on i = 0, . . . ,n, and so
(4) ˆXi = 1
ai
(logΛ− logλi)+wi, i = 0, . . . ,n.
Summing up the both side over i and then using X = ∑i Xi, we have
X =
1
a
logΛ−
n
∑
i=1
logλi
ai
+w,
where a is defined by 1/a = ∑ni=0(1/ai) and w = ∑ni=0 wi. From this,
logΛ = a(X −w)+a
n
∑
i=1
logλi
ai
.
Substituting this into (4), we obtain
ˆXi =
a
ai
(X −w)−
logλi
ai
+wi +
a
ai
n
∑
j=1
logλ j
a j
, i = 0, . . . ,n.
Now consider the case where a1 = · · ·= an and w1 = · · ·= wn for any n. Then we can expect
ˆX1 = · · ·= ˆXn and so it is natural to assume λ1 = · · ·= λn. In this case, the equalities just above
become
ˆX0 =
a
a0
(X −w)+w0+
na
a0a1
log λ1,(5)
ˆX1 =
a
a1
(X −w)+w1−
log λ1
a1
+
na
a21
logλ1.(6)
Further, the condition (3) implies
E
[
1
ai
(1− e−ai(wi− ˆXi))
]
=
1
ai
(1− e−aiwi), i = 1, . . . ,n,
and by (6) we have
E[ea1
ˆX1 ] = E[e−aX ]e−aw+a1w1 λ−(1−na/a1)1 .
So, (3) for i = 1 is equivalent to
(7) −
(
1− na
a1
)
logλ1 + logE[e−aX ]−aw+a1w1 = 0.
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This equality determines λ1 that we look for. (6) and (7) yield
ˆX1 =
a
a1
(X −w)+w1+
1
a1
(
a1w1−
(
1−
na
a1
)
log λ1
)
=
a
a1
(X −w)+
1
a1
(
− logE[eaX ]+aw
)
=
a
a1
X −
1
a1
logE[eaX ].
Further,
ˆX0 =
a
a0
(X −w)+w0−
na
a0a1
1
1− na
a1
(
logE[eaX ]−aw+a1w1
)
.
Here, a1/(na) = (na0 +a1)/(na0). Thus, 1−na/a1 = a1/(na0 +a1). From this we see
na
a0a1
1
1− na
a1
=
na
a0a1
(
1+
na0
a1
)
=
na
a1
·
1
a
=
1
a
−
1
a0
.
Therefore, (5) and (7) yield
ˆX0 =
a
a0
X +
(
1
a
−
1
a0
)
logE[eaX ]− aw
a0
+w0−
naw
a1
+nw1 =
a
a0
X +
(
1
a
−
1
a0
)
logE[eaX ].
Now, since a → 0 as n→ ∞ and
lim
s→0
1
s
logE[esX ] = E[X ],
we finally arrive at the following result:
Theorem. Under the assumptions and the notation above, the optimally diversified risks ˆX0 ≡
ˆX (n)0 and ˆX1 ≡ ˆX
(n)
1 satisfy
lim
n→∞
ˆX (n)0 = E[X ], limn→∞
ˆX (n)1 = 0,
almost surely.
The theorem means that under the assumptions that each agent has an exponential utility and
the investors for the diversification are homogeneous, by diversifying the risk over many reinsur-
ers or investors and by adding the expected value premium we can decrease the uncertainty of
the risk to zero eventually. Moreover, the participants for the diversification lose nothing in the
limit.
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